[Rudey]

Let's make sure we understand something before I repeat the same words over and over again. I did not say I know the answer or that I'm an expert on it. Nowhere did I come off like that. If anyone said they were an expert it was you. Next, it's you that keeps taking jabs at me so cut it out with saying I'm insulting you. Projection is the term.

Again, you were not there and are not an expert on it and did no investigation. You just wrote 2 paragraphs and in fact said the same stuff from the beginning before there was even any mention of a map. Why? Because of your inherent bias. Furthermore this bias is emphasized when you keep refering to the IDF having some history of covering things up. You haven't said what happened and why it happened. Just accusations. Nothing more by you.

Rob, simply put you are not an expert, were not there, and did no investigation. That's not a bad thing. I'd say that for myself and everyone on here. But your "shoot first and ask questions later" methodology followed by your "pretend to know the answers" methodology is a bad thing.

-Rudey

Originally Posted by RACooper

Listen Rudey, I know a hell of a lot more than you when it comes to issues of military hardware or operations… and quite frankly the IDF excuse of an erroneously marked map designating the UN post as a Hezbollah defensive position just doesn’t hold-up to even a cursory examination.

Now I know you are resorting to the same tired tactic of insulting or personally attacking the poster in an effort to diminish their arguement or view... but that's all your doing, you haven't even tried to defend the excuse/scenario put forth by the IDF; at least try and present some speculation or something backing up the "hand drawn" map scenario presented by the IDF.

Before any military operation, no matter how big or small, there is a briefing session of some sort – this is where planning, timing, and objectives are worked out or handed down. As part of any operation involving artillery or air support, extreme care is taken with mapping out enemy sites, avenues of approach and fire, support ranges for arti, etc. But the important part is that the map becomes the centre of attention: as the officers, FOs, communications personnel, and squad leaders all need to make sure of important co-ordinates and significant features on their maps.

Now conceivably someone had marked their map wrong, perhaps even at the command level, and incorrect information was handed-out through the chain-of-command and briefings… but here in lies the flaw in the “hand drawn map” argument – there would have been dozens of maps, including the computer based ones in the SP-Arty and aircraft… so either we are left with the conclusion that the infantry, artillery, airforce, armoured, drone, and command elements all altered their maps (manually or electronically) or made new “hand drawn” ones; and ignored the indicators (flag, communications, and personnel themselves) that the post was indeed a UN post – or with the possibility of someone intentional targeting the post.

It’s hard to explain to someone without military experience, but calling in artillery or air-strikes isn’t as simple as calling in the co-ordinates on your map and having the munitions arrive on target. There are a series of steps and procedures carried out in following through with a strike request, albeit very-fast, that should have checked the fire on the UN post – particularly given the 14 hour long bombardment… it’s not like it was a target of opportunity situation. The forward infantry and armoured in direct sight of the post and personnel should have noted that the post was in fact manned by UN personnel; the artillery plotters should have noted that their hard-copy and electronic maps marked the post as UN (and presumably a restricted fire area); the forward observers and air-controllers should have either visually seen that it was a UN post or noted so on their maps; the operator of the laser designator for the 14 hour long bombardment should have certainly noted the UN personnel that replaced the flag that was blown-off by one bombardment; the battle-area command post monitoring communications and reports should have during the 14 hours made note of the UN presence on the ground; the IDF liaison and command in communication with both the post and UN should have passed their information along; the air operations briefing should have covered the post’s condition as a UN site; the air-controllers that co-ordinate air operations for ground support should have noted on their maps that it was a UN post; and finally the pilot himself should have visually noted that he was targeting a UN post and would have had to ask for confirmation before attacking. It’s hard to believe that all of the above didn’t happen.

But fine, if you don’t think I’m qualified or properly trained, why not ask others on GC with past or current military experience about their thoughts? I’m assuming you’ll give more weight to their observations on how serious a breakdown in procedure, communications, and command there must have been to have one “hand drawn” map lead to the death of the 4 UN observers.