Examination US Military Counterinsurgency Operations
 

I know that there are some members of the armed servicesm as well as those who have more than a passing interest in military matters.

I came across a rather detailed and interesting examination/critique of the US Military operations in Iraq - written by a UK Brigadier General from the Coalition Command...

Really facinating reading that examines the transition from war operations to post-war operations. He is somewhat critical of the operational doctrine currently being used...

I'd be interested in any opinions or observations to be made regarding the points raised by the Brigadier.

Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations
Article:
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...c05/aylwin.pdf

Gimme a little time to digest this, Coop... some interesting reading there.

I was most struck by the highlighting of a "binary" approach to war - combat or "not-combat"... leaving the murky greay area of Counterinsurgency and Low Intensity Combat unexplored in US Army doctrine. I had always been aware that US doctrine and training placed incrediblely focused attention on combat/battlefield operations... what I didn't know is that combat/battlefield operations held such a singular role for the military mindset.

Further, while I was aware of the increased turn-over rate of Capt.; I had no idea that the exodus had caused a responding drop of 25% in the time it to rank (or "pin").

I wish the Brigadier could have contrasted UK and US operations, perhaps in conjunction with a US counterpart - you can sorta tell the document was meant for British Military consumption based on it's language and focus.