| moe.ron |
11-18-2004 12:47 PM |
Dunno if this will answer your question, but this is a good assessment of what is going on in Indonesia:
Quote:
Political developments after the Bali tragedy
Presented by Sarwono Kusumaatmadja
1. Violence as a means to meet objectives has had a long history in Indonesia. Lack of conflict resolution mechanisms, an incompetent and corrupt judiciary and police as well as simplistic and insensitive policies have led to outbreaks of violence amongst the populace. Authorities habitually utilized violence as an approach to discredit and stifle opposition as well as in facilitating land acquisition of big business and to suppress labour unrest, among other reasons. All the above factors have contributed to the perpetuation of violence which has continued in the years after Suharto. As such it is not an easy matter to investigate acts of violence especially terrorism, since there are numerous candidates who may have motives as well as the means to perpetrate heinous acts like the Bali bombing of 12 Oct 2002.
2. Although the police has so far conducted a credible process of investigation with uncharacteristic resolve and skill, regretfully marred by a farcical and callous joke trading between a suspect and the Chief of Police, the ultimate answers to the tragedy will depend on future political developments. Terrorism is a violent act of politically motivated crime, and since it may be distinguished from other crimes for its political content, the truth behind the Bali bombing can only be found in a political climate in which confidence and trust in the government has been restored. Therefore linkages between the perpetrators of the bombing and other networks whether they be domestic or international may only be convincingly disclosed by a government with strong leadership enyoying a moral high ground. Otherwise, the police may be frustrated in their attempts to consummate their task to the full. Producing an answer to the Bali bombing, however credible, may raise other questions in need of urgent answers. It is not within the capacity of the present leadership to cope with such a situation.
3. After an initial flurry of activities, leading to the signing of anti terrorism act, the consolidation of intelligence agencies and a serious investigation of the Bali bombing, the government has fallen to the previous style of interagency bickering on a wide variety of subjects, with the President acting as a hapless onlooker. As such, the investigation being undertaken by the police may risk losing its initial focus of attention, and it will then take another dramatic turn of events for Indonesia to return to much-needed attention to the Bali incident and for the due process of law to bring justice to the culprits.
4. The present political tensions in Indonesia have their roots in the mainstream belief systems, all of which have evolved from earlier years. A closer look on how political Islam has evolved will be of relevance in looking at how violence increasingly became an integral part of power games. In the 1950s mainstream Islam hoped to establish an Islamic state through a parliamentary approach, resulting in a deadlocked Constitutional Assembly in 1959, in which both the secular mainstream and political Islam failed to achieve the needed absolute majority to establish a permanent constitution. The support for establishment of an Islamic state received 45% of the vote. In the following years, however, the idea of establishing an Islamic state lost considerable support and has become a non-issue. The mainstream Islamic movement, represented by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah has instead chosen to inculcate religious values in society, recognising that basically state institutions should remain secular. This evolution in political thinking may perhaps explain the radicalisation of the shrinking numbers of true believers in the idea of an Islamic state. The manipulation and violent suppression of this hardline minority during the earlier years of the Suharto regime may also contribute to their isolasionist and hostile attitudes towards any ideas and social entities outside their own, and increasingly the ideological leanings of this group veer toward the strict Wahabi stream of the Arabian peninsula, opening the way for intensified contacts with likeminded comrades in the Middle East and paving the way to their participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union and training as well educational opportunities in various likely countries. The internationalization of this hardline movement then led to pan Islamic ideas of nationhood, hence the establishment of Jama’ah Islamiyah in Malaysia with the dream of establishing an Islamic state encompassing parts of South East Asia with muslim majorities.
5. Police investigations, enjoying substantial public support, so far have pointed in the direction of the Jama’ah Islamiyah network, laying to rest doubts whether such a group ever existed. Previous scepticism of the existence of Jama’ah Islamiyah (J.I.) was however well founded due to several reasons. First, jama’ah islamiyah is a generic term referring to any congregation of the devout. It is usual for communities of muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere to see themselves as jama’ah islamiyah. Second, a history of manipulation and violent suppression of devout muslims contributed to this attitude of wariness, shared by non muslims as well. Third, very little information aside from that provided by foreign governments is known about J.I. , which is only natural since J.I. is a secretive society, whose inner workings can only be uncovered by a thorough intelligence approach. This sort of intelligence work by foreign governments was and is still viewed with distrust, reflecting the lack of credibility of the intelligence apparatus in Indonesia, coupled also with the belief across religious lines that some foreign governments have the habit of intimidating and harassing opponents by a deliberate engineering of information. The nature of Indonesia as a low trust society gives rise to a fabulous number of conspiracy theories available to the public, some of them bizzare and yet some of them believable to a sizeable audience.
6. Given this atmosphere of low trust, the public support for the police is indeed remarkable. Perhaps this is due to the fact that so many foreign nationals died in the horrific blast, in Bali of all places, leading to a case of shame and wounded national pride. Another reason related to the above is the appointment of Gen. Mangku Pastika as chief investigator, a no nonsense and professional policeman of excellent reputation. For the police, recently separated from the Armed Forces, the investigation is especially vital to establish primacy in pursuing cases of political crime, formerly the domain of the Army. Third is the large presence of foreign investigators of various countries, leading the police and other agencies to put their best effort. Therefore it is a longstanding fact that despite grumblings and apparent dislike of foreign interference, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that external pressures are always there when things begin to get done. Even Laskar Jihad, an ultranationalistic muslim paramilitary group, felt it necessary to quote a fatwa from a Saudi cleric as a major reason for their disbandment
7. The Bali tragedy presents a window of opportunity for Indonesia to forge solidarity and cohesion, and to begin to reestablish trust and generate hope. However, this is far from easy. The government’s incapacity to provide leadership is a foregone conclusion. The society lacks natural leaders that have a broad appeal to a heterogenuous populace. A potential rallying point is the mainstream Islam which has enjoyed a mutually rewarding relationship with minorities, but its most prominent leader Mr. Abdurrahman Wahid has lost influence and prestige. The Bali bombing may effectively increase the distance between the moderate Islamic majority and the violent few, but this does not translate automatically into a posistion of leadership since Indonesia’s political field is a minefield of mistrust, anger and frustation. To give an example, it is one thing to keep a healthy distance from the violent fringe and to condemn their actions and to demand that justice prevail, but one does not want to be seen as being an agent of western powers in doing that. This field may present an opportunity for a populist demagogue , but we still have to find one after Sukarno who has his ability to provide leadership to a complex mix of people. All of which gives rise to speculation that the military may be considered as providing this leadership vacuum.
8. The shift of attention from human rights and democracy to the war on terrorism provides an opportunity for the military to strenghten their leadership potential, but the hurdles are huge. The emergence of a better image of the army necessitates an answer to widespread and undenied belief that elements of the army have been actively promoting conflicts in Papua, Ambon, and Poso in keeping with past tradition of fomenting unrest as a means of control. The international community, although in a lesser sense due to the shift in priorities, are also watchful of the ongoing trials on human rights abuses in East Timor. Unless the military finds resolve to act against their own kind, trust as a paramount social capital will still be outside their reach. While the police have already found a newly found source of trust which they still have to build up as time passes, the military so far has not done so. A cessation of conflict in Aceh will be a welcome progress as far as the military is concerned, but their most serious problem is their zealous commitment to impunity.
9. Consistent with the time honoured phenomenon that political developments inside the country are always influenced by major international dynamics, the Bush Administration policies are keenly watched in Indonesia. The prospect of a messy and protracted war in Iraq with the equally messy and bloody process of regime change, if it occurs at all, is especially worrisome since there is a generally held view that this particular war will open a Pandora box of widespread conflict. It is seen as an ironic tragedy that the US as a victim of 11 September 2001, will risk being viewed as a source of global conflict. In that sort of scenery voices of moderation in Indonesia will face an enormous challenge from an unlikely alliance of xenophobic ultra nationalists and Islamic hardliners sharing a common constituency, the millions of impoverished, unemployed youth of Indonesia.
10. In conclusion, the Bali tragedy provides a precious opportunity for Indonesia to shape up, but there is a worrisome outlook that this opportunity may be missed due to leadership problems in Indonesia and a negative trend in international politics, of which the impending war in Iraq looms large. Indonesia in particular and the world as a whole may experience further tragic losses of innocent lives, before a prospect of a better future can emerge.
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